Do debit cards increase household spending? Evidence from a
  semiparametric causal analysis of a survey by Mercatanti, Andrea & Li, Fan
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
24
41
v2
  [
sta
t.A
P]
  3
 Fe
b 2
01
5
The Annals of Applied Statistics
2014, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2485–2508
DOI: 10.1214/14-AOAS784
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2014
DO DEBIT CARDS INCREASE HOUSEHOLD SPENDING?
EVIDENCE FROM A SEMIPARAMETRIC CAUSAL
ANALYSIS OF A SURVEY
By Andrea Mercatanti1 and Fan Li2
Bank of Italy and Duke University
Motivated by recent findings in the field of consumer science,
this paper evaluates the causal effect of debit cards on household
consumption using population-based data from the Italy Survey on
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Within the Rubin Causal
Model, we focus on the estimand of population average treatment
effect for the treated (PATT). We consider three existing estimators,
based on regression, mixed matching and regression, propensity score
weighting, and propose a new doubly-robust estimator. Semipara-
metric specification based on power series for the potential outcomes
and the propensity score is adopted. Cross-validation is used to select
the order of the power series. We conduct a simulation study to com-
pare the performance of the estimators. The key assumptions, overlap
and unconfoundedness, are systematically assessed and validated in
the application. Our empirical results suggest statistically significant
positive effects of debit cards on the monthly household spending in
Italy.
1. Introduction. The past few decades have seen a steadily increasing
global trend in the use of noncash payment instruments such as credit,
debit, charge and prepaid cards as well as electronic money. Research on
the psychology of consumer behavior provides a theoretical basis for sup-
porting the thesis that payment instruments can play a significant role in
consumer decisions. Possibly the most important concept coming out of this
field of research is mental accounting, that is, the set of cognitive opera-
tions used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep
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track of financial activities [Thaler (1985, 1999)]. Starting from this con-
cept, recent research has proposed theories on prospective accounting, cou-
pling, retrospective evaluations, and financial resources accessibility [Prelec
and Loewenstein (1998), Soman (2001), Morewedge, Hotzman and Epley
(2007)], which have stimulated deeper investigation on the effects of non-
cash payment instruments on consumption. Indeed, there has been substan-
tial evidence that consumers who have cards overspend compared to those
who do not [e.g., Burman (1974), Hirschman (1979), Tokunaga (1993), Cole
(1998), Mann (2006)]. However, the observed association between the level
of spending and the possession of cards does not necessarily indicate the
existence of causal links; the association could be due to differences between
the characteristics of card owners and nonowners, or to differences in the
situations in which cash and cards are the preferred methods of payment.
Despite the practical importance of the problem and the large literature on
causal inference in statistics and economics, to our knowledge, there is essen-
tially no analysis on the causal effects of payment instruments on consumer
spending.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the causal effects of debit
cards possession on spending, using data from the Italy Survey on Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW) within the Rubin Causal Model [RCM; Rubin
(1974, 1978), Holland (1986)]. Debit cards are defined as cards enabling
the holder to have purchases directly charged to funds on his account at a
deposit-banking institution [C.P.S.S. (2001)], and in Italy they are usually
called “carte Bancomat.” Our focus on debit cards is principally motivated
by the fact this payment instrument does not allow consumers to incorpo-
rate additional long-term sources of funds, as in the case of credit cards. By
considering debit cards, it is therefore possible to eliminate the confound-
ing intertemporal reallocations of wealth from the psychological effects on
spending [Soman (2001)]. Alternatively, prepaid cards could be relevant to
the current study’s objectives, because they do not allow the consumer to
be granted a line of credit. However, their diffusion in Italy is at the moment
low.
Under the RCM, each unit has a potential outcome corresponding to each
treatment level, and the causal effect is defined as a comparison between the
potential outcomes of a common set of units. Ideally we would conduct an
analysis with units being individuals possessing debit cards, because debit
cards are typically issued to individuals. However, SHIW collects information
only on the household level. To mitigate this problem, in our study, we set
household as the unit, but limit the sample of treated units to the households
possessing one and only one debit card. Such a choice ensures that a possible
effect on household spending will be due only to the individual possessing
the card, which is usually the head of the household. Formally, the unit-
level causal effect of holding debit card is defined as the difference between
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the potential spending corresponding to with one and only one debit card
and without debit cards. In particular, we are interested in the “population
average treatment effect for the treated” (PATT), that is, the average causal
effect for the households holding one debit card. The PATT identifies the
change in the average consumption for the households holding one debit
card and due only to the debit card, and thus provides a scientifically sound
answer to the question of whether debit cards encourage spending.
Because at most one potential outcome is observed for each unit, unit-
level causal effects are generally not identifiable. Nevertheless, population
average causal effects can be identified under some assumptions. The most
important and widely adopted identifying assumption is unconfoundedness
[Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)], which rules out self-selection into the treat-
ment. Another key assumption is overlap, which ensures overlap in covariate
distributions between groups. We maintain both assumptions throughout
the paper. An integral component of our application is to systematically
assess, directly or indirectly, the plausibility of these assumptions.
We estimate the PATT from the SHIW data using three existing estima-
tors, based on regression, propensity score weighting, mixed matching and
regression, as well as a new doubly-robust (mixed weighting and regression)
estimator. To flexibly model the large number of covariates, we choose to pro-
ceed from a semiparametric perspective based on power series specifications.
Over the last decade, non- and semi-parametric methods have been revealed
to be successful in attaining desirable properties where standard parametric
models fail. In fact, under a semiparametric power series approach, the ef-
ficiency bound for a causal effect estimator under unconfoundedness [Hahn
(1998)] is attained by a regression-based method [Imbens, Newey and Ridder
(2005)] or by weighting on the estimated propensity scores [Hirano, Imbens
and Ridder (2003)]. Other advantages include the following: first, a correc-
tion based on power series regressions allows for a matching method to be
unbiased and consistent [Abadie and Imbens (2006)]; second, the overlap
assumption can be easily assessed by relying on undersmoothed specifica-
tion for the propensity score [Imbens (2004)]; and, finally, the assessment of
unconfoundedness can be performed by testing equality restrictions on the
coefficients of power series regressions for the treated and untreated units
[Crump et al. (2008)]. Despite these advantages, power series-based semi-
parametric approaches have not been widely used in practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the the-
ories and some empirical findings, mainly from the consumer psychology
literature, that motivate the current research problem. Section 3 sets up
the causal approach, introduces the new doubly-robust estimator and three
existing estimators, and describes the semiparametric specification. A small
simulation study is carried out in Section 4 to compare the estimators. In
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Section 5, we first present some preliminary results of the real data, then as-
sess the key assumptions, and finally apply the semiparametric methods to
estimate the causal effects of possessing debit cards on household spending.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Motivating background. Research in psychology and consumer sci-
ence shows that consumers are highly sensitive to contextual information
that may induce perceptual contrasts when making evaluations [Helson
(1964), Hsee et al. (1999), Kahneman and Miller (1986), Morewedge, Hotz-
man and Epley (2007), Parducci (1995)]. This field of research provides
arguments for supporting that a consumer’s evaluation of the amount of
disposable financial resources can be heavily influenced by the size of the
financial resources cognitively, or temporarily, accessible at the time of pur-
chasing [Heat and Soll (1996), Soman and Cheema (2002), Thaler (1985)].
Based on results from one small experiment, Morewedge, Hotzman and Ep-
ley (2007) suggested that consumers perceive a unit of consumption to be
cheaper when large, as opposed to, small financial resources are made cogni-
tively accessible. As a result, large financial accounts, such as the money in
one’s savings account, are likely to increase the likelihood of consumption as
compared to small financial resources, such as the amount of money in one’s
wallet. But Morewedge et al. did not explain when consumers are likely to
think in terms of small versus large disposable resources. It is reasonable to
postulate that the method of payment can activate thoughts about different
financial resources. Therefore, it would be useful to investigate the effects of
payment instruments that provide direct access to larger financial resources,
such as debit or credit cards, on consumption.
A second motivation stems from the findings of Soman (2001), who showed
that payment instruments influence the memory for and the impact of past
expenses on spending behavior. Two features of payment mechanisms—
rehearsal of the price paid and the immediacy of wealth depletion—were
manipulated using a controlled experiment in which recall and retrospec-
tive evaluation of payments were measured simultaneously with the pur-
chase intention. The experiment involved four different payment instru-
ments: checks, debit cards, charge cards, and charge checks. Debit cards
are here characterized by no rehearsal (like charge cards) in that consumers
do not need to write down the total amount; rather, they involve immedi-
ate wealth depletion (like checks). Soman’s study shows that past payments
significantly reduce future spending intentions when the payment instru-
ment requires consumers to write down the amount paid as well as when
the consumer’s wealth is depleted immediately rather than with a delay.
Some attempts to quantify the effects of payment instruments, especially
credit cards, on spending were conducted by small-scale randomized exper-
iments [Feinberg (1986), Prelec and Simester (2001), Soman (2001)]. All of
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these studies were performed on a small sample of volunteers, raising the con-
cern of external validity, as there may be significant difference between the
volunteers and the targeted population. Moreover, all but one of the exper-
iments involve only simulated series of payments rather than real monetary
transactions. Also, the experiment in Feinberg (1986) that is based on real
monetary transactions only manipulates exposure to credit card stimuli, not
the payment method itself.
Population-based observational studies generally do not match the inter-
nal validity of randomized experiments, but they usually offer better external
validity. Therefore, a careful causal analysis on a large population-based ob-
servational data with information on real monetary transactions, which was
absent in the literature to our knowledge, would provide a good comple-
ment to these randomized studies. This motivates our analysis of the SHIW
data, a biennial, nationally representative survey run by Bank of Italy aim-
ing to collect information on several aspects of Italian households’ economic
and financial behavior. SHIW contains rich information related to house-
hold characteristics, spending, and payment instruments, and thus provides
a great opportunity to evaluate the causal effect of debit card possession on
spending in Italian households.
3. Causal inference.
3.1. Setup, estimand, and assumptions. Consider a large population of
units, each of which can potentially be assigned a treatment indicated by
z, with z = 1 for active treatment and z = 0 for control. A random sample
of N units from this population is drawn to evaluate the treatment effect
on some outcome. For each unit i (i = 1, . . . ,N), let Zi be the observed
treatment status, and Xi = {Xi1, . . . ,Xir} be a set of r pre-treatment vari-
ables (i.e., covariates) and the N × r matrix X has ith row equal to Xi.
We assume the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption [SUTVA; Rubin
(1980)], that is, no interference between the units and no different versions
of a treatment. Then each unit i has two potential outcomes Yi(0) and Yi(1),
corresponding to the potential treatment levels z = 0 and z = 1, respectively.
Between the two potential outcomes, only the one corresponding to the ob-
served treatment status, Yi = Yi(Zi), is observed. In our study, the unit is
the household; the treatment status equals one if the household possesses
one and only one debit card and zero if the household does not possess debit
cards; and the outcome is the monthly household spending on all consumer
goods. SUTVA is deemed reasonable in this setting, as the holding of debit
cards in one household does not seem to affect the potential spending of
other households.
Our primary interest lies in the causal effect of having debit card on spend-
ing for the households who possess one and only one debit card. Therefore,
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the target causal estimand is the population average treatment effect for the
treated (PATT):
τPATT ≡ E{Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Zi = 1}.(1)
To identify the PATT, we maintain the standard assumption of unconfound-
edness.
Assumption 1 (Unconfoundedness). The treatment assignment is inde-
pendent of the potential outcomes given a vector of pre-treatment covariates
Xi:
{Yi(0), Yi(1)} ⊥ Zi|Xi.
Unconfoundedness assumes that the treatment assignment is randomized
conditional on a set of pre-treatment covariates, and thus rules out self-
selection into the treatment. It is also referred to as the assumption of “no
unmeasured confounders.” Under unconfoundedness, we have Pr(Yi(z)|Xi) =
Pr(Yi|Zi = z,Xi), and thus causal effects can be estimated by the average
difference in the observed outcome between the groups that have balanced
covariate distributions. However, unconfoundedness, sometimes questionable
in observational studies, is generally untestable. Nevertheless, there are indi-
rect ways to assess its plausibility. In particular, we will adopt the proposal
of Crump et al. (2008) to assess unconfoundedness by a test on a pseudo-
outcome, namely, the lagged outcome in this application.
The second assumption ensures overlap in the covariate distributions be-
tween the treatment and control groups.
Assumption 2 (Overlap). Each unit in the population has a nonzero
probability of receiving each treatment:
0< e(x)≡Pr(Zi = 1|Xi = x)< 1 ∀x,
where e(x) is called the propensity score [Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)].
Violation to the overlap assumption generally leads to operational difficul-
ties, such as large variances in weighting estimators, as well as conceptual
difficulties because the potential outcome under one treatment level for cer-
tain values of covariates would never be observed and the causal effect would
be a priori counterfactual. The overlap assumption is directly testable, for
example, by visually inspecting the distributions of the estimated propensity
scores between groups. The combination of Assumptions 1 and 2 is referred
to as “strong ignorability” [Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)].
When the interest is in estimating the PATT, the outcome distribution
for the treated is directly estimable so that the two assumptions can be
slightly weakened [Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (19978)] and replaced by
unconfoundedness only for the untreated units, Yi(0)⊥Zi|Xi, and with the
weak overlap, Pr(Zi = 1|Xi = x)< 1 for any x.
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3.2. Estimators. We first introduce three existing estimators for the
PATT. Let µz(x) = E{Yi(z)|Xi = x} be the regression function for the po-
tential outcome Y (z), for z = 0,1. The first estimator is based on the estima-
tion of the regression function for the untreated units µ0(x), from which the
counterfactual outcome for the treated unit i can be predicted as µˆ0(Xi).
The estimated PATT is obtained from averaging the observed and the pre-
dicted outcomes of the treated, as dated back from the parametric version
of this estimator [Rubin (1977)]:
τˆreg =
N∑
i=1
Zi{Yi− µˆ0(Xi)}
/ N∑
i=1
Zi.(2)
A parametric prediction of µˆ0(x), however, would be sensitive to differences
in the distributions of the pre-treatment variables between the treatment
groups, which would make the estimation procedure rely heavily on the
functional specification [Imbens (2004)]. Alternatively, Imbens, Newey and
Ridder (2005) showed that the estimator with a nonparametric estimation
of µˆ0(xi) based on power series can achieve the nonparametric efficiency
bound for the PATT [Hahn (1998)].
The second estimator is based on propensity score weighting, originated
from the inverse probability weighting technique in survey sampling [Horvitz
and Thompson (1952)]. It is easy to show that
E
{
YiZi − Yi(1−Zi)e(Xi)
1− e(Xi)
}
= τPATT.
Therefore, one can define the ATT weights for each unit: wi = 1 for the
treated units (Zi = 1) and wi = eˆ(Xi)/(1− eˆ(Xi)) for the control units (Zi =
0), where eˆ(Xi) is the estimated propensity score for unit i. The weighting
estimator for the PATT with the sum of the weights in each group being
normalized to one [Hirano and Imbens (2001)] is
τˆwt =
∑N
i=1 YiZiwi∑N
i=1Ziwi
−
∑N
i=1 Yi(1−Zi)wi∑N
i=1(1−Zi)wi
.(3)
Here the (estimated) propensity scores are used to create a weighted sam-
ple of untreated units that has the same covariate distribution as that in
the treated group [Li, Morgan and Zaslavsky (2014)]. Hirano, Imbens and
Ridder (2003) showed that the efficiency bound for PATT estimators can be
achieved by weighting on the power series logit estimates of the propensity
scores.
The third estimator is a mixed matching and regression approach. A stan-
dard matching estimator for PATT is obtained as follows: first, for each
treated unit i, find m closest matched untreated units according to a met-
ric defined in the space of the covariates; second, take the average of the
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observed outcome of the m matches as the estimated counterfactual out-
come Yˆi(0); and finally estimate the PATT by the average of the estimated
individual effects of the treated units. Matching estimators ensure good bal-
ance in covariates between groups and are generally robust [see, e.g., Ichino,
Mealli and Nannicini (2008)]. However, if the number of matches is fixed
and matching is done with replacement, Abadie and Imbens (2006) showed
the bias of this estimator is O(N−1/p), where p is the number of continu-
ous covariates, while the variance of the estimator is O(N−1). In our study,
p= 6 so that, asymptotically, the bias will not disappear and the standard
confidence interval will not be necessarily valid. To improve the asymptotic
properties of matching estimators, Abadie and Imbens (2011) proposed a
mixed method where for each treated unit, matching is followed by local
regression adjustments, which adjust for the residual differences in the co-
variates between the treated unit and its matches:
τˆmix =
N∑
i=1
Zi
[
Yi−
∑
j∈Mi
{Yj + µˆ0(Xi)− µˆ0(Xj)}
/
m
]/ N∑
i=1
Zi,(4)
where Mi is the set of the indices of the m closest matches of unit i, and
µˆ0(x) is the predicted outcome from a regression estimated using only the
matched sample. If µˆ0(x) is estimated from a power series regression, the
resulting PATT estimator can be proven to be consistent and asymptotically
normal, with its bias dominated by the variance.
Finally, we propose a new mixed estimator for the PATT that combines
weighting and regression:
τˆdr =
∑N
i=1 YiZi∑N
i=1Zi
− 1∑N
i=1Zi
N∑
i=1
Yi(1−Zi)eˆ(Xi) + µˆ0(Xi)(Zi − eˆ(Xi))
1− eˆ(Xi) .(5)
This estimator requires specifying models for both potential outcomes and
propensity score. We can prove τˆdr is “doubly-robust” (DR) (see the
Appendix), that is, it has the large sample property that the estimator
is consistent if either the propensity score model or the potential outcome
model is correctly specified, but not necessarily both [Robins, Rotnitzky and
Zhao (1995)]. The existing literature on DR estimators has exclusively fo-
cused on the average treatment effect (ATE) estimand. To our knowledge,
estimator (5) provides the first explicit DR estimator for the PATT. Like the
DR estimator of the PATE, (5) is a member of the class of consistent, effi-
cient, semiparametric estimators of Robins, Rotnitzky and Zhao, where the
numerator of the second term has the form of that in a weighting estimator
but augmented by an expression involving the regression for the outcomes.
Besides the main theoretical advantage of robustness compared to the
weighting or the regression estimator, the DR estimator can also serve as a
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diagnostic tool in practice: if the DR estimate differs much from the regres-
sion estimate, but is similar to the weighting estimate, it would suggest a
potential misspecification of the regression model (e.g., an incorrect choice
of the order term of the power series or lack of interaction term) or a lack
of overlap. Alternatively, if the DR estimate differs from the weighting esti-
mate, but is similar to the regression estimate, it would suggest a potential
misspecification of the propensity score model, which is possible even if the
visual check of the estimated propensity scores suggests sufficient overlap.
Both τˆmix and τˆdr are mixed approaches: combining regression with match-
ing or weighting. Weighting and matching have distinct operating charac-
teristics: weighting is a “top-down” approach in the sense that it applies
weights to the entire sample and is designed to create global balance for
the target population, whereas matching is a “bottom-up” approach in the
sense that it limits the analysis to the matched subsample and is designed to
create local balance for this subsample [Li, Morgan and Zaslavsky (2014)].
Both methods have pros and cons, and there is no universal rule for choosing
between them, which highly depends on the goal and practical constraints of
a specific study. As shown in the simulations, the mixed-matching estimator
is more robust than the DR estimator, but is less efficient when there is no
misspecification.
Different ways to calculate the standard errors have been adopted for
these PATT estimators. The delta method and the bootstrap lead to valid
standard errors when the estimators are based on series estimates of the
regressions and/or the propensity scores. Here we adopt bootstrap for τˆreg,
τˆwt, and τˆdr. Bootstrap is not valid for matching methods with a fixed num-
ber of matches, and the standard errors for τˆmix have been obtained using
the estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006).
3.3. Semiparametric specification. All of the four estimators require spec-
ifying regression functions for either potential outcome µz(x) or propensity
score e(x) or both. Parametric specification is the standard approach in
the literature. However, parametric methods are usually sensitive to imbal-
ance between groups and misspecification, a serious concern in observational
studies with a large number of covariates. Nonparametric specification is
flexible and less prone to misspecification, but is often difficult to estimate
due to the potentially large number of parameters. Therefore, in this paper
we choose the semiparametric specification based on power series [Hausman
and Newey (1995), Das, Newey and Vella (2003)] for both potential outcome
and propensity score, which combine the virtues and mitigate the problems
of parametric and nonparametric approaches.
The main idea is to divide the covariates X into two groupsX(1) andX(2),
and specify a semiparametric, partially linear model for the mean function:
µ(X;β) =X(1)β+ g(X(2)),(6)
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where X(1), with dimension h, enters the model in a simple linear fashion
(as main effects), and X(2), with dimension s, enters the nonparametric part
of the model, g(·). We now give the general (and somewhat complex) form
of power series specification of µ(·), followed by a simple example used in
our application. Let r = h + s be the dimension of the argument of µ(·),
and λ = (λ1, . . . , λr) be a multi-index of nonnegative integers with norm
|λ| =∑rj=1λj . Let Xλi =Xλ1i1 · · ·Xλrir be the product of the powers of the
components of Xi, and {λ(k)}∞k=1 a series of distinct multi-index such that
|λ(k)| is nondecreasing. Let pk(Xi) =Xλ(k)i , pk(Xi) = (p1(Xi), . . . , pk(Xi))′,
and finally Pk(X) = (pk(X1), . . . ,pk(XN ))
′. Given the particular order term
k, the series estimator of the regression function µ(X;β) under the treatment
z (z = 0,1) is
µˆz(X;β) =Dk,z(D
′
k,zDk,z)
−1
D′k,zY˜z,(7)
where the design matrix is Dk,z =Pk(X˜z), with X˜z, Y˜z being the matrices
and the vector of all the observed values of X,Y in group z.
In our application, we choose X(1) to contain all the dummy variables of
discrete covariates, X(2) to contain all the continuous covariates, and g(·)
to be a polynomial for each variable in X(2) with the same maximum power
term l excluding interactions. Here k = 1 + h+ s× l. A simple example is
when there is only one discrete variable, Xi(1) = {Xi1}, and one continuous
variable, Xi(2) = {Xi2}. Let λ= (λ1, λ2), Xλi =Xλ1i1 ·Xλ2i2 , and the sequence
of λ(k) with nondecreasing norm be
λ(1) = (0,0), λ(2) = (1,0), λ(3) = (0,1),
λ(4) = (0,2), . . . , λ(k) = (0, l).
Then the generic term pk(Xi) = (1,Xi1,Xi2,X
2
i2, . . . ,X
l
i2)
′. If l = 3, then
k = 5 and the mean model is
µ(Xi;β) = β0 +Xi1β1 +Xi2β21 +X
2
i2β22 +X
3
i2β23.
A key component in the implementation is the choice of the order term k.
We will adopt the standard “leaves-one-out” cross-validation (CV) approach,
which selects the k that minimizes the mean squared errors (MSE) when
predicting the outcome of each unit from all other units.
For the propensity score, we assume
log
{
e(X)
1− e(X)
}
= µe(X;βe),(8)
where µe(X;βe) is specified as in model (6). The closed-form least square
estimator for µe is generally unavailable and the parameters are estimated
via numerical methods. The order term of the power series is also chosen
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from CV based on minimizing a MSE criterion, where the predicted error
for each unit is the difference between the observed Zi and the estimated
propensity score eˆ(Xi). Such a choice is driven by the balance between the
bias and the variance of eˆ(X). In estimating propensity scores, we are mainly
interested in reducing the bias rather than the variance; particularly we want
to obtain propensity score estimates that balance the covariates between the
groups. For this reason, Imbens (2004) recommends to adopt higher order
power series than the one chosen by CV, that is, undersmooth the estimation
of the propensity score, and thus reduce the risk of failure in detecting a lack
of overlap in covariate distributions.
4. Simulations. To compare the performance of the four estimators, we
conduct a small simulation study. The hypothetical population is set to be
two groups of units with different distributions of pre-treatment covariates;
each unit has a continuous outcome Y and two covariates, a binary X1 and
a continuous X2. This is to mimic a real situation where, for example, the
population consists of two groups with the minority being a group of people
with higher social-economic status; Y is the consumption, Z is a payment
instrument, for example, debit card, and Z = 1 means possessing a card,
and X1 and X2 are education and income, respectively. The variables X1
and X2 are drawn from the following distributions:
X1 ∼ Bernoulli(0.25),
X2|X1 ∼ 1{X1 = 1} ·N(80,20) + 1{X1 = 0} ·N(20,20).
Both the true propensity score and the potential outcomes models are set
to be nonlinear (quadratic) functions of X2, and the parameters are chosen
based on the estimated coefficients of education and income in the corre-
sponding model from the real data. Specifically, the true propensity score
model, shown in Figure 1, left panel (with X1 = 0), is
logit{e(X)}=−2+X1 + 0.0004X22 ,
so that the propensity score is equal to 0.14 if X1 = 0 and X2 = 20, to 0.83 if
X1 = 1 andX2 = 80. The true potential outcomes models, shown in Figure 1,
right panel (with X1 = 0), are
Y (0) =−0.1 + 0.1X1 +0.043X2 − 0.00022X22 + ε,
Y (1) = 0.1X1 + 0.043X2 − 0.00012X22 + ε,
where ε∼N(0,0.15). The figures show that the first derivative of the propen-
sity score increases with X2 while the first derivative of the potential out-
comes decreases with X2. These models lead to a true PATT of 0.5778
(evaluated on large samples).
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Fig. 1. Logit of the propensity score (left) and the potential outcomes [right, solid line
E{Y (1)}, dashed line E{Y (0)}] as a function of X2 with X1 = 0 in the simulations.
We generate 500 simulated samples, each consisting of 1000 units. For each
unit, we first generate X1 andX2, and then generate two potential outcomes,
and the propensity score, based on which treatment status Z is drawn. For
each simulated sample, we apply the semiparametric model selected by CV
in comparison to the simple linear specification models β0+β1X1+β2X2, for
each estimator. The DR estimator has been evaluated also for the two cases
where the potential outcomes models or the propensity score model are set
to be linear (misspecified). The number of matches in the mixed-matching
estimator is set to 6.
Table 1 reports the absolute bias, root of mean squared error (RMSE),
and coverage of the 95% confidence interval of each estimator. Unsurpris-
Table 1
Average absolute bias (bias), root mean square error (RMSE), and coverage of the 95%
confidence interval (coverage) of different estimators in the simulation. The estimators
τˆdr (p.s.) and τˆdr (p.o.) represent the (partially misspecified) DR estimator with the
propensity score model and the potential outcome model misspecified, respectively. Note
that these two estimators, though presented under the “semiparametric” category, are in
fact mixed-semiparametric–linear ones
Semiparametric Linear
Bias RMSE Coverage Bias RMSE Coverage
τˆreg 0.022 0.035 0.889 0.200 0.202 0
τˆwt 0.001 0.058 0.920 0.067 0.077 0.879
τˆmix 0.009 0.035 0.939 0.062 0.072 0.697
τˆdr 0.003 0.034 0.924 0.144 0.150 0.159
τˆdr (p.s.) 0.016 0.033 0.897 – – –
τˆdr (p.o.) 0.008 0.138 0.740 – – –
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ingly, the semiparametric specification dominates its linear counterpart for
each estimator. Within the semiparametric specification, the weighting and
the DR estimator have the smallest biases (0.001 and 0.003, resp.), with
DR having a lower RMSE (0.034). Coverage of the 95% confidence intervals
are similar between these two estimators (0.920 for τˆwt and 0.924 for τˆdr).
The mixed-matching estimator gives a larger bias (0.009) but similar RMSE
and coverage to those of the DR estimator. The regression estimator gives
the biggest bias (0.022) and the lowest coverage (0.889). When only the
propensity score model is misspecified, the DR estimator still outperforms
both the weighting and the regression estimator. But when both the models
are misspecified DR leads to much higher bias and RMSE than the mis-
specified weighting estimator. The mixed-matching estimator appears to be
the least sensitive to misspecifications among the four estimators, especially
when there is significant covariate imbalance between treatment groups, as
in this simulation. More simulations (omitted here) show this advantage di-
minishes with increasing covariate balance or decreasing sample size. Finally,
the results demonstrate the aforementioned diagnostic potential of the DR
estimator: when only the propensity score model is misspecified, the bias
from the DR estimator is closer to that obtained from a correctly-specified
regression estimator, while when only the potential outcomes model is mis-
specified, the bias from the DR estimator is closer to that obtained from a
correctly-specified weighting estimator.
5. Application to the Italy SHIW data.
5.1. Data and preliminary analysis. The SHIW has been run every two
years since 1965 with the only exception being that the 1997 survey was
delayed to 1998. We denote by t the generic survey year, and by (t + 1)
the subsequent survey year. We define the target population as the set of
households having at least one bank current account but no debit cards
at t. The treatment Z is posed equal to 1 if, at t + 1, the household (all
members combined) possesses one and only one debit card, equal to 0 if, at
t+ 1, the household do not possess debit cards. The households with more
than one debit cards are excluded from the sample; therefore, a household
for which Z = 1 is characterized by having acquired their first (and only)
debit card during the span t→ (t+1). Though we do not have exact infor-
mation of the ownership of the debit cards, it is reasonable to assume that
it is the head of the household who possesses the card in most cases. The
outcome on which to evaluate the treatment effect is the monthly average
spending of the household on all consumer goods3 and is observed at t+ 1.
3For the outcome, the relevant question asks to consider all spending, on both food and
nonfood consumption, and it excludes only purchases of precious objects, purchases of cars,
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The pre-treatment variables include the following: the lagged outcome, some
background demographic and social variables referred either to the house-
hold or to the head householder, the number of banks, and the yearly based
average interest rate in the province where the household lives. The subset
of pre-treatment variables referred to the household includes the following:
the number of earners (four categories), average age of the household (five
categories), family size (five categories), the overall household income and
wealth, the Italian geographical macro-area where the household lives (three
categories), the number of inhabitants of the town where the household lives
(four categories), and the monthly average cash inventory held by the house-
hold. Those related to the head householder include age (five categories) and
education (six categories). All the information is drawn from responses to
the SHIW questionnaires with the exception of the number of banks and
the average interest rate that are available since 1993 from the Bank of Italy
Monetary Statistics. These two variables have been suggested by Attana-
sio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002), who showed, in a noncausal context and to
different purposes, that interest rate and the number of banks in the area
where the household lives have a significant contribution to the probability
of acquiring a debit card in Italy.
The PATT is estimated by comparing the observed outcomes for the
treated units with their predicted counterfactual outcomes. As a conse-
quence, reliable inferences need sufficiently large samples of untreated units
where to predict the counterfactual outcomes. SHIW is a repeated cross-
section with a panel component, namely, only a part of the sample comprises
households that were interviewed in previous surveys. Our analysis will fo-
cus on the households observed for two consecutive surveys. Table 2 reports
the samples sizes for each span, t→ (t+1), where t= 1993,95,98, distinctly
by treated and untreated units. The relative frequency of untreated units
(the households not possessing debit cards) alongside the total sample size
Table 2
Sample sizes and relative frequency of treated and untreated units for each span
Treated Untreated
t → (t + 1) Size Rel. freq. Size Rel. freq. Total
1993–1995 223 0.217 805 0.783 1028
1995–1998 188 0.322 396 0.678 584
1998–2000 160 0.230 534 0.770 694
purchases of household appliances and furniture, maintenance payments, extraordinary
maintenance of the dwelling, rent for the dwelling, mortgage payments, life insurance
premiums, and contributions to private pension funds.
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has a considerable drop after 2000. Accordingly, the analysis will be limited
to the span until 1998–2000, the latest presenting considerable share of both
untreated units and total sample size.
As a preliminary step, we conduct a simple descriptive cross-sectional
analysis on the subsample of households observed in a single sweep of the
survey. The sample size, shown in the first row of Table 3, is considerably
larger than that of the corresponding year in Table 2. The average difference
in monthly average spending between households possessing one debit card
and households without a debit card is 324.9, 307.8, and 437.3 thousands of
Italian Liras (the Italian currency until 2002) in year 1995, 1998, and 2000,
respectively. Though not sufficient to establish causal effects of debit cards
on spending, this shows that consumers in Italy who possess debit cards
spend more compared to those who do not. To explore the characteristics
of the households possessing debit cards, we fit a logistic model to this sub-
sample, where the log odds ratio of having one debit card at a certain year is
linearly regressed on a set of background demographic and social variables
observed at the same year. The variables and their estimated coefficients are
shown in Table 3. We observe significant contributions for many of the ex-
planatory variables for each year. In particular, the probability of observing
a household that has one debit card increases with income, the town size,
education of the head householder, from the South to North of Italy, while
it decreases with the average age of the household.
5.2. Model specification. We estimate the propensity score and the po-
tential outcomes according to the semiparametric specification in Section 3.3,
where the order term is selected from leave-one-out CV. For both models,
the covariates include those listed in Table 3, the cash inventory held by the
household, and the lagged outcome from the previous survey. Tables 4 and
5 report the mean squared predicted errors (MSE) for the propensity score,
e(x), and the outcome regression, µz=0(x), respectively, where l denotes the
maximum power term in the power series expansion of the nonparametric
part g(·) in model (6). The MSE for estimating the propensity score is mini-
mized, for each span, when the continuous pre-treatment variables are posed
at the simplest linear specification, l= 1. We then undersmooth the propen-
sity score specification by expanding g(·) to l = 5. For the outcome model,
according to Table 5, we set l = 1 for the spans 1993–1995 and 1998–2000,
and l= 3 for the span 1995–1998.
5.3. Assessment of overlap, balance, and unconfoundedness. We assess
the overlap assumption by plotting the distribution of the estimated propen-
sity scores in the treatment and control groups and visually inspecting the
overlap. Figure 2 presents the histograms of the propensity scores estimated
from the semiparametric model (8) for the treated and control groups, which
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Table 3
MLE of the coefficients (p-values in parenthesis) of the logistic model with response
variable being the indicator of a household having one debit card
1995 1998 2000
Sample size 4636 4010 4528
Intercept −1.80 (0.00) −0.02 (0.96) 0.30 (0.46)
Income 1.3× 10−5 (0.00) 3.9× 10−6 (0.00) 7.9× 10−6 (0.00)
Wealth −4.8× 10−7 (0.00) −9.0× 10−8 (0.19) −2.3× 10−7 (0.00)
Geographical area (baseline: North):
Center −0.46 (0.00) 0.01 (0.92) −0.15 (0.18)
South and Islands −0.77 (0.00) −0.36 (0.00) −0.60 (0.00)
Town size (baseline: <20,000):
20,000–40,000 0.21 (0.02) −0.04 (0.64) −0.11 (0.25)
40,000–500,000 0.40 (0.00) 0.13 (0.12) −0.02 (0.75)
>500,000 0.60 (0.00) 0.28 (0.10) −0.11 (0.48)
Family size (baseline: 1):
2 0.03 (0.80) 0.03 (0.79) −0.01 (0.88)
3 0.08 (0.59) 0.18 (0.24) −0.17 (0.23)
4 −0.00 (0.98) 0.03 (0.84) −0.09 (0.58)
>4 −0.14 (0.46) −0.03 (0.86) −0.37 (0.06)
No. of earners (baseline: 1):
2 −0.09 (0.25) −0.04 (0.62) 0.11 (0.18)
3 −0.05 (0.69) 0.12 (0.41) 0.09 (0.50)
>3 −0.00 (0.96) −0.36 (0.14) −0.05 (0.81)
Average age of the household (baseline: <31):
31–40 −0.12 (0.28) −0.22 (0.06) −0.25 (0.04)
41–50 −0.23 (0.11) −0.12 (0.46) −0.31 (0.05)
51–65 −0.38 (0.03) −0.31 (0.11) −0.40 (0.03)
>65 −1.09 (0.00) −0.90 (0.00) −1.31 (0.00)
Education of the head of the household (baseline: none):
Elementary school 0.31 (0.12) 0.14 (0.52) 0.70 (0.00)
Middle school 0.94 (0.00) 0.68 (0.00) 1.06 (0.00)
Prof. 2nd school 0.98 (0.00) 0.76 (0.00) 1.38 (0.00)
High school 1.32 (0.00) 1.09 (0.00) 1.64 (0.00)
University 1.36 (0.00) 1.19 (0.00) 1.76 (0.00)
Age of the head of the household (baseline: <31):
31–40 −0.05 (0.73) −0.07 (0.70) 0.22 (0.24)
41–50 −0.25 (0.15) −0.33 (0.11) −0.10 (0.60)
51–65 −0.40 (0.04) −0.41 (0.07) −0.23 (0.28)
>65 −0.62 (0.00) −0.86 (0.00) −0.48 (0.04)
Average interest rate 0.21 (0.05) 0.07 (0.68) −0.30 (0.15)
Number of banks −0.00 (0.16) 0.00 (0.13) 0.00 (0.31)
shows a satisfactory overlap in all three spans. Nevertheless, for the purpose
of further improving the overlap, we discard the very few units with extreme
values of the estimated propensity score: one unit for the span 1993–1995,
and four units for the span 1995–1998.
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Table 4
MSEs for predicting propensity score e(x),
obtained from leave-one-out cross-validation, and
∗ denotes the minimized MSE
l 1993–1995 1995–1998 1998–2000
1 0.4076∗ 0.4748∗ 0.4082∗
2 0.4099 0.4771 0.4114
3 0.4097 0.4808 0.4201
4 0.4120 0.4862 0.4204
5 0.4126 0.4886 0.4265
Table 5
MSEs for predicting µz=0(x), obtained from
leave-one-out cross-validation, and ∗ denotes the
minimized MSE
l 1993–1995 1995–1998 1998–2000
1 544.8∗ 597.1 1141.8∗
2 569.8 597.9 2040.8
3 634.7 590.5∗ 2.9 · e5
4 1230.2 592.0 7.9 · e6
5 2224.7 1352.6 4.1 · e7
We further check the balance of covariates based on the estimated propen-
sity score under each estimating method. In particular, we measure covariate
balance by the absolute standardized difference (ASD), that is, the absolute
difference in the means of the weighted covariate between the treatment
and control groups divided by the square root of the sum of within group
Fig. 2. Histograms of the estimated propensity score for the treated (blue) and the un-
treated (red). The first is for the span 1993 to 1995, the second is for the span 1995 to
1998, and the third is for the span 1998 to 2000.
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Fig. 3. Boxplots of the absolute standardized difference of all covariates in the original,
weighted, and matched data.
variances:
ASD=
∣∣∣∣
∑N
i=1XiZiwi∑N
i=1Ziwi
−
∑N
i=1Xi(1−Zi)wi∑N
i=1(1−Zi)wi
∣∣∣∣
/√
s21/N1 + s
2
0/N0,(9)
where Nz is the number of units and s
2
z is the standard deviation of the
unweighted covariate in group Z = z for z = 0,1. For the original data (used
in the regression estimator τˆreg), wi = 1 for each unit and ASD is the stan-
dard two-sample t-statistic; for the weighting-based estimators (τˆwt and τˆdr),
wi are the ATT weights defined before; for the matching-based estimator
(τˆmix), for each treated unit wi equals 1 and for each control units wi equals
the number of that unit being sampled (can be larger than 1 in the case
of matching with replacement). The boxplots of the ASD for all covariates
from different methods are shown in Figure 3. Weighting leads to substantial
improvement in the overall balance of all covariates, with the largest ASD
smaller than 1 (1.96 can be viewed as a threshold of significant difference).
This can be viewed as evidence that the propensity score is well estimated.
For the mixed matching-regression estimator τˆmix, the number of matched
units m was set at 6, and the distance metric, ‖x‖ = (x′Sx)1/2 where S is
the diagonal matrix of the inverses of the covariates variances, is adopted.
From the boxplot we can see matching (m= 6) also improves balance, but
significant residual imbalance presents in several variables. Comparing co-
variate balances and estimated effects obtained from matched samples with
different values of m (2 to 6), we noticed a bias-variance trade-off in τˆmix:
a larger number of matches (m) increases residual imbalance in covariates,
but at the same time decreases the standard errors of the estimate. Because
the regression step in τˆmix can adjust for the residual imbalance, we choose
m= 6 in the SHIW to reduce the standard errors.
The unconfoundedness assumption is generally untestable, and here we
adopt the approach of Crump et al. (2008) to indirectly assess its plausibility
via a test based on quantifying the treatment effect on the lagged outcome.
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The idea is that the lagged outcome, Ylag, can be considered a proxy for
Y (0) and, given it is observed before the treatment, it is unaffected by
the treatment. Consequently, if the average treatment effect on the lagged
outcome is estimated to be zero for all subpopulations defined by the rest
of the pre-treatment covariates, V= (X \ Ylag), then the unconfoundedness
assumption is plausible. The hypotheses are formalized as
H0 :E(Ylag,z=1− Ylag,z=0|V= v) = 0 ∀v vs.
H1 :∃v s.t. E(Ylag,z=1− Ylag,z=0|V= v) 6= 0,
and can be tested using the aforementioned power series regression approach
to estimation for average treatment effects. In particular, given the order
term k, the series estimator of the regression function µz(v) of the lagged
outcome Ylag under the treatment z (z = 0,1) is
µˆz(V) =Dk,z(D
′
k,zDk,z)
−1
D′k,zY˜lag,z =Dk,zξˆk,z,
where Dk,z = Pk(V˜z), with V˜z, Y˜lag,z being the matrices and the vector
of all the observed values of V,Ylag in group z and Pk(·) defined as in
Section 3.3. Chen (2007) shows that if k increases with the sample size N
(even if at a lower rate), the test statistic Q is the quadratic form and
converges to a chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom under the
null hypothesis:
Q= (ξˆk,1− ξˆk,0)′Sˆ−1k (ξˆk,1 − ξˆk,0)→ χ2(k),
where Sˆk =
∑
z Sz with Sz being the estimated limiting variance of
√
Nz ξˆz,k.
Therefore, implementation of the test is identical to that of a parametric test
for the equality restrictions ξk,1 = ξk,0 in the parametric setting.
Table 6 shows the values for Q (along with their respective p-values)
under the null of unconfoundedness, where l is set to lmin CV, namely, the
maximum power term in the power series expansion of the nonparametric
part g(·) for which the MSE is minimized. For 1995–1998 and 1998–2000,
lmin CV do not coincide for the untreated, lmin CV = 5,1, respectively, and
the treated units, lmin CV = 4,2. For these two spans, lmin CV has been posed
at 5 and 2, respectively, for the regressions µz(v) in order to undersmooth the
Table 6
Results from the tests to assess unconfoundedness
1993–1995 1995–1998 1998–2000
lmin CV 3 5 2
k 42 52 38
Q 52.7 43.9 36.9
p-value 0.124 0.780 0.522
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Table 7
Estimated PATT in thousands of Italian Lira (standard errors in parenthesis)
τˆreg τˆwt τˆmix τˆdr
Span AOT PATT PATT
AOT
PATT PATT
AOT
PATT PATT
AOT
PATT PATT
AOT
1993–1995 2092.9 90.2 0.043 102.3 0.049 100.6 0.048 97.2 0.046
(41.8) (47.1) (50.4) (42.7)
1995–1998 2027.6 199.1 0.098 160.7 0.079 208.7 0.103 202.2 0.100
(87.6) (73.4) (69.8) (93.2)
1998–2000 2116.4 148.1 0.069 137.7 0.065 122.8 0.058 142.1 0.067
(68.5) (73.1) (60.7) (70.5)
nonparametric specification. The p-values for the three periods (0.124, 0.780,
0.522 for period 1993–1995, 1995–1998, 1998–2000, resp.) suggest that there
is no difference in the lagged outcome between groups and, consequently,
the unconfoundedness assumption is deemed plausible.
5.4. Results. We obtain results from the regression estimator τˆreg, the
propensity score weighting estimator τˆwt, and the DR estimator τˆdr by using
common routines for linear and logistic regressions in STATA and GAUSS.
Point estimates and standard errors from the mixed matching-regression
estimator τˆmix have been obtained by the STATA program by Abadie et al.
(2003).
Table 7 reports the effects of debit cards on household monthly consump-
tion estimated from the four estimators. The ratios between each estimated
PATT and the Average Outcome for the Treated (AOT) are also reported.
Positive and statistically significant estimates of the PATT are consistently
obtained across all estimators and all spans. For the span of 1993–1995, the
increase in the monthly consumption for the household with one debit card
ranges from 4.3% to 4.9% (90.2 to 100.6 thousands Italian Liras) across the
four estimators; for the span of 1998–2000, the increase ranges from 5.8% to
6.9% (122.8 to 148.1 thousands Liras). The period 1995–1998 emerges with
particular high estimated PATT, ranging from 7.9% (160.7 thousands Liras)
to 10.3% (208.7 thousands Liras) of the household monthly consumption.
This can be explained by the fact that the period was observed one year
longer (the planned survey for 1997 was delayed one year and shifted to
1998); therefore, the use of debit cards could have benefited from the longer
span to more strongly affect consumers’ behavior. Note that in the span of
1995–1998, the weighting estimate is significantly different from both the
regression and the DR estimates, suggesting a potential misspecification of
the propensity score.
Overall, these results support current psychological theories about the ef-
fects of debit cards on spending. As debit cards do not allow the consumer
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to incorporate an additional long-term source of funds, our analysis largely
eliminates the potential confounded effect of an intertemporal reallocation
of wealth [Soman and Cheema (2002)]. Therefore, the significant estimated
effects on spending can be ascribed only to psychological reasons, in particu-
lar, those pertaining to the aforementioned theories regarding the rehearsal
of the price paid [Soman (2001)] and regarding the accessibility of financial
resources [Morewedge, Hotzman and Epley (2007)]. Both theories state that
payments by debit cards enlarge the perceived amount of financial resources
available for consumption compared to pay cash. This is due, in one case,
to an impact on the memory of past expenses and, in the other case, to the
cognitive accessibility to a larger financial resource like the savings account.
Our findings can be explained by the microeconomic theory of consumer
choice in that the perception of larger disposable financial resources implies
less budget constraints. This enlarges the set of affordable bundles and in-
creases the ordinary demand because the most preferred affordable bundle,
that is, the rational consumer’s choice, will be composed by a larger quantity
of goods for rational utility functions. This is essentially an income effect;
however, if the occasions to pay by debit cards differ by categories of goods,
also a substitution effect will be in act. The latter could be studied by eval-
uating the effect on spending for different categories of goods, for example,
for food versus nonfood consumption.
6. Conclusion. Motivated by recent findings in the field of consumer sci-
ence, we conduct a population-based study based on the Italy SHIW data to
evaluate the causal effect of debit cards on household consumption. Within
the RCM, we adopt several power series-based semiparametric approaches
to estimate the PATT. The key assumptions, overlap and unconfounded-
ness, are systematically assessed and validated. Our analysis suggests that
possessing debit cards significantly increases monthly household spending in
Italy, consistent with and complementary to the findings from several small
randomized experiments in psychology and consumer science.
One limitation of the study is that only short-time effects of the considered
payment instrument have been here evaluated. In fact, the SHIW data do
not provide information about the moment a treated household has acquired
its debit cards. We only know it has happened during the two, or three, years
of the considered span, so that we have likely estimated one to one-and-a-
half years long effects. A desirable extension of this work may be to apply
the same causal methods to suitable data sets that allow for enlarging the
extent of the temporal effects of debit cards. Another limitation is that, due
to data availability, this study focuses on household rather than individual
spending. This problem is partially mitigated by restricting the analysis to
households with one and only one debit card. Nevertheless, an analysis on
singleton households or households formed only by a couple or population-
based data with individual information would provide more information.
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We have focused on the PATT estimand; other estimands may be of in-
terest depending on the study goal. For example, if the goal were to plan
a marketing policy aimed to increase spending by stimulating the use of
noncash payment instruments, then the relevant causal effect should be on
untreated units. Consequently, the estimators considered here need to be
modified accordingly.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THE “DOUBLE ROBUSTNESS” PROPERTY
OF THE ESTIMATOR τˆDR
It is trivial to prove the first term of (5),
∑N
i=1 YiZi/
∑N
i=1Zi, converges
to E{Y (1)|Z = 1}.
For the second term, first suppose the outcome model µ0(X) is correctly
specified but the propensity score e(X) is misspecified, so that µˆ0(X)→
E(Y (0)|X), eˆ(X)9 Pr(Z = 1|X). Then we have
1∑N
i=1Zi
N∑
i=1
Yi(1−Zi)eˆ(Xi) + µˆ0(Xi)(Zi − eˆ(Xi))
1− eˆ(Xi)
=
1∑N
i=1Zi
{ ∑
i:Zi=1
µˆ0(Xi) +
∑
i:Zi=0
Yieˆ(Xi)− µˆ0(Xi)eˆ(Xi)
1− eˆ(Xi)
}
(10)
=
1∑N
i=1Zi
∑
i:Zi=1
µˆ0(Xi)
+
∑N
i=1(1−Zi)∑N
i=1Zi
1∑N
i=1(1−Zi)
∑
i:Zi=0
{
Yieˆ(Xi)
1− eˆ(Xi) −
µˆ0(Xi)eˆ(Xi)
1− eˆ(Xi)
}
.
It is straightforward to prove, given the law of large numbers and the consis-
tency of µˆ0(X), that
∑
i:Zi=1
µˆ0(Xi)/
∑N
i=1Zi converges to EX{E(Y (0)|X)|
Z = 1}, and ∑i:Zi=0 Yieˆ(Xi)1−eˆ(Xi)/
∑N
i=1(1−Zi) and
∑
i:Zi=0
µˆ0(Xi)eˆ(Xi)
1−eˆ(Xi)
/∑N
i=1(1−Zi) converge to the same quantity EX{E(Y (0)|X) eˆ(X)1−eˆ(X) |Z = 0}.
Consequently, equation (10) converges to (the subscript i is dropped to sim-
plify the notation)
EX{E(Y (0)|X)|Z = 1}=
∫
x
f(x|Z = 1)E{Y (0)|X= x}
=
∫
x
f(x|Z = 1)E{Y (0)|X= x,Z = 1}
=
∫
x
f(x|Z = 1)
∫
y(0)
y(0)f(y(0)|X= x,Z = 1)
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=
∫
y(0)
y(0)f(y(0)|Z = 1)
= E{Y (0)|Z = 1}.
Above, the second equation is due to the unconfoundedness assumption.
Alternatively, suppose e(X) is correctly specified while µ0(X) is misspec-
ified, so that eˆ(X)→ Pr(Z = 1|X), µˆ0(X)9E(Y (0)|X). Again, it is easy to
prove, given the law of large numbers and the consistency of eˆ(Xi), that the
quantities
∑
i:Zi=1
µˆ0(Xi)/
∑N
i=1Zi and
∑
N
i=1(1−Zi)∑
N
i=1Zi
1∑
N
i=1(1−Zi)
×∑
i:Zi=0
{ µˆ0(Xi)eˆ(Xi)1−eˆ(Xi) } converge to the same quantity EX{µˆ0(X)|Z = 0}, and∑
N
i=1(1−Zi)∑
N
i=1 Zi
1∑
N
i=1(1−Zi)
∑
i:Zi=0
{ Yieˆ(Xi)1−eˆ(Xi)} converges to
Pr(Z=0)
Pr(Z=1)EX{Pr(Z=1|X)Pr(Z=0|X) ×
E(Y (0)|X)|Z = 0}. Consequently, equation (10) converges to
Pr(Z = 0)
Pr(Z = 1)
EX
{
Pr(Z = 1|X= x)
Pr(Z = 0|X= x)E(Y (0)|X)|Z = 0
}
=
Pr(Z = 0)
Pr(Z = 1)
∫
x
f(x|Z = 0)Pr(Z = 1|X= x)
Pr(Z = 0|X= x)
∫
y(0)
y(0)f(y(0)|X= x)
=
∫
x
f(x|Z = 0)f(x|Z = 1)
f(x|Z = 0)
∫
y(0)
y(0)f(y(0)|X= x,Z = 1)
=
∫
y(0)
y(0)
∫
x
f(x|Z = 1)f(y(0)|X= x,Z = 1)
=
∫
y(0)
y(0)f(y(0)|Z = 1) = E{Y (0)|Z = 1}.
The same arguments apply to the case of both µ0(X) and e(X) correctly
specified. Then, τˆdr converges to E{Y (1)|Z = 1} − E{Y (0)|Z = 1} = τPATT
when the outcome model µ0(X) and/or the propensity score model e(X)
are correctly specified. 
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